How Countries Seek to Strengthen Anti-Money Laundering Laws in Response to the Panama Papers, and the Ethical Implications of Incentivizing Whistleblowers by Del Mundo, Carmina Franchesca S.
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 
Volume 40 
Issue 1 Fall Article 3 
Fall 2019 
How Countries Seek to Strengthen Anti-Money Laundering Laws 
in Response to the Panama Papers, and the Ethical Implications 
of Incentivizing Whistleblowers 
Carmina Franchesca S. Del Mundo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb 
 Part of the International Trade Law Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
Commons, and the Taxation-Transnational Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carmina Franchesca S. Del Mundo, How Countries Seek to Strengthen Anti-Money Laundering Laws in 
Response to the Panama Papers, and the Ethical Implications of Incentivizing Whistleblowers, 40 NW. J. 
INT'L L. & BUS. 87 (2019). 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol40/iss1/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized editor 
of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
Copyright 2019 by Carmina Franchesca S. Del Mundo Vol. 40, No. 1 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 
87 
How Countries Seek to Strengthen 
Anti-Money Laundering Laws in 
Response to the Panama Papers, and  
the Ethical Implications of 
Incentivizing Whistleblowers 
Carmina Franchesca S. Del Mundo 
Abstract: 
The Panama Papers is currently the world’s largest whistleblower case that 
involved 11.5 million leaked documents and over 214,000 offshore entities. It all 
linked back to one Panamanian law firm, Mossack Fonseca. In 2016, over 400 
investigative journalists collaboratively and simultaneously published stories 
that exposed the money laundering and tax-evading schemes committed by the 
rich and powerful. This included political figures and heads of states, 
celebrities, sports figures, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups. 
This article aims to dissect the innerworkings of Mossack Fonseca’s asset-
shielding strategy and investigate how the Panamanian law firm was able to 
circumvent the tax and anti-money laundering laws of over 50 countries. We 
will also examine the global responses to the Panama Papers, the proposed 
reforms and strategies, and the obstacles to moving forward. Finally, this 
article explores the ethical duties of lawyers, the significance of attorney-client 
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The Panama Papers refer to the 11.5 million documents that an 
anonymous source leaked to journalists in 2015. It exposed the fraudulent 
and criminal activities committed by political figures, celebrities, sports 
figures, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups.1 It is currently the 
world’s largest whistleblower case, and as Edward Snowden2 describes it, 
“the biggest leak in the history of data journalism.”3 The documents 
revealed financial records, email chains, and corporate filings associated 
with more than 214,000 offshore holdings and tax havens, which all linked 
back to one Panamanian law firm, Mossack Fonseca.4 
It all started when journalist Bastian Obermayer of Germany’s 
Süddeutsche Zeitung5 received a message from “John Doe,” the anonymous 
source. At first, the story was going to be handled by only Bastian 
Obermayer and Frederik Obermaier of Süddeutsche Zeitung.6 However, 
they soon discovered that there were thousands of shell companies and over 
forty years of records detailing how these offshore tax havens operated 
under the radar.7 Therefore, the two journalists reached out to Gerard Ryle, 
the director of the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
(ICIJ), and as they delved deeper into the sea of leaked documents, it was 
clear that they needed to expand their team.8 
About 400 journalists from over eighty countries secretly collaborated 
                                                          
 1 Luke Harding, Foreword to BASTIAN OBERMAYER & FREDERIK OBERMAIER, THE 
PANAMA PAPERS: BREAKING THE STORY OF HOW THE RICH & POWERFUL HIDE THEIR MONEY, 
at vii, viii (2016). 
 2 Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) employee, leaked 
classified information to journalists in 2013 regarding the U.S. government’s global 
surveillance operations, which consisted of surveillance and storage of communications data 
of anyone within the United States or abroad. See generally JOURNALISM AFTER SNOWDEN: 
THE FUTURE OF THE FREE PRESS IN THE SURVEILLANCE STATE (Emily Bell, Taylor Owen, 
Smitha Khorana & Jennifer Henrichsen eds., 2017). 
 3 See front page of OBERMAYER, supra note 1.  
 4 Harding, supra note 1, at viii. 
 5 Süddeutsche Zeitung (translates to “South German Newspaper”) is one of Germany’s 
largest daily newspapers. It won numerous awards for its investigative journalism and is 
known to have spearheaded the Panama Papers investigation. 
 6 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 10; note that Obermayer and Obermaier are not at all 
related. 
 7 Gerard Ryle, How the Panama Papers Journalists Broke the Biggest Leak in History, 
TED.COM: TEDSUMMIT (June 2016), https://www.ted.com/talks/gerard_ryle_ 
how_the_panama_papers_journalists_broke_the_biggest_leak_in_history?language=en#t-
776082. 
 8 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 24. The International Club of Investigative Journalists 
(ICIJ) is an initiative under the Center for Public Integrity (CPI) that encourages journalists 
to share investigative material with each other when it is of international relevance. See 
generally INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://www.icij. 
org/about/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2019). 
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and investigated the millions of leaked documents for over a year.9 They 
agreed to simultaneously publish the story and expose the global pattern of 
corruption and criminal activity on April 3, 2016.10 To protect the source’s 
identity, the 400 journalists had agreed not to give the public access to the 
entire database of leaked documents. The Panama Papers “spawned the 
biggest journalism collaboration in history . . . [journalists were] working 
shoulder to shoulder, sharing information, but telling no one.”11 The 
journalists called it the “Panama Papers” as a “conscious echo of the 
Pentagon Papers,” which were volumes of top-secret documents leaked by 
Daniel Ellsberg in 1971 that “lifted the lid on the [United States (U.S.)] 
War in Vietnam.”12 
In response to the Panama Papers, numerous domestic and 
international jurisdictions have looked to strengthening their laws to 
regulate the criminal activities of tax evasion and money laundering. 
However, in seeking to address this global issue, it seems that the call for 
transparency and incentivizing whistleblowers could come at the expense of 
preserving attorney-client privilege. This paper will compare the challenges 
that many countries face in reforming Anti-Money Laundering (AML) laws 
after the Panama Papers, as well as analyze the implications that these 
proposed reforms have on legal ethics. 
II. THE PANAMA PAPERS: THE GLOBAL SCALE OF 
CORRUPTION 
Mossack Fonseca,13 a Panamanian-based law firm with over forty 
offices worldwide, became a “one-stop shop for all the asset-shielding 
needs of the rich and powerful.”14 Its client-billings exceeded $42 million, 
and a majority of its clients sought to evade taxes and conceal their 
financial activities using offshore shell companies.15 The millions of leaked 
documents linked back to 500 banks from all over the world, dozens of 
dictators and heads of states, families of political figures and public 
officials, celebrities, and even terrorist organizations.16 The Panama Papers 
unearthed the tax-evasion tactics of the super wealthy—revealing how, 
                                                          
 9 Harding, supra note 1, at ix. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Ryle, supra note 7; see also OBERMAYER supra note 1, at 24. 
 12 Harding, supra note 1, at viii-ix. 
 13 Mossack Fonseca was founded in 1986 by Jurgen Mossack, a German who grew up 
and practiced law in Panama, and Ramón Fonseca, a Panamanian lawyer, politician and 
author. See generally OBERMAYER supra note 1, at 25-31. 
 14 Joe Mont, Inside the Panama Papers, 13 COMPLIANCE WEEK 22, 24 (2016). 
 15 Will Fitzgibbon, Offshore Secrecy: Panama Papers Law Firm Mossack Fonseca 
Closes its Doors, THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Mar. 
14, 2018), https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/panama-papers-law- 
firm-mossack-fonseca-closes-doors; see also Harding, supra note 1, at, vii. 
 16 Mont, supra note 14, at 24. 
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through Mossack Fonseca, billions of dollars were “earned from arms, drug 
and blood-diamond trafficking, and other illegal business[es].”17 
A. Who were the True Clients? 
A majority of Mossack Fonseca’s clients who were involved in 
fraudulent activities and money laundering were politicians and heads of 
states. The list includes: 
[T]he prime ministers of Iceland18 and Pakistan; the king of Saudi 
Arabia; Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko; $2 billion in 
transactions connected to associates of Russian President Vladimir 
Putin; and offshore companies linked to the family of Xi Jinping, 
general secretary of China’s Communist Party. In Brazil, [Mossack 
Fonseca was] entangled in “Operation Car Wash,”19 a bribery and 
money laundering scandal that [involved] former president Luiz 
Inacio Lula da Silva20 . . . and President Dilma Rousseff.21 
Additionally, the then Argentinian President Cristina Kirschner was 
involved with 123 shell companies to hide the $65 million she had 
smuggled out of the country.22 Journalists also found links to FIFA, the 
UEFA, and their respective presidents.23 There were connections to 
“African dictators, Central American drug barons, convicted sex 
                                                          
 17 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 9. 
 18 The Prime Minister of Iceland was named “Businessman of the Year” before his 
crimes came to surface; OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 315. 
 19 See, e.g., David Segal, Petrobras Oil Scandal Leaves Brazilians Lamenting a Lost 
Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/business/ 
international/effects-of-petrobras-scandal-leave-brazilians-lamenting-a-lost-dream.html 
(This involved bribe payments to politicians through the gifting of Rolex watches, yachts, 
and helicopters by construction and service-work companies that wanted to be contracted 
with the state-run oil company, Petrobras). 
 20 Former President Lula da Silva negotiated his surrender with the police and is now 
serving a 12-year prison sentence for corruption and money laundering; see Law and Justice 
in Brazil: Lula Goes to Jail, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.economist.com/ 
the-americas/2018/04/08/lula-goes-to-jail. 
 21 Mont, supra note 14, at 24. Note that President Dilma Rousseff was impeached in 
August 2016. 
 22 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 4. Many of these shell companies were actually found 
in the United States—in the tax haven state of Nevada; see also J. Weston Phippen, Nevada, 
a Tax Haven for Only $174: The Panama Papers Show How the U.S. State Has Become a 
Favored Destination Rivaling the Cayman Islands and Switzerland, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 6, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2016/04/panama-papers-nevada/47699 
4/ (In Nevada, there are “minimal reporting and disclosing requirements” and “stockholders 
are not public record[s];” “The state offers tax benefits [and] also removes much of the 
liability from the owner in case of a lawsuit.”). 
 23 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 315. FIFA stands for Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (French for “International Federation of Association Football”), which 
is an organization that is known for major international football tournaments, such as the 
World Cup. UEFA stands for the Union of European Football Associations. 
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offenders,”24 mafia organizations, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda; each of these 
entities were found to be associated with an offshore company that 
Mossack Fonseca helped establish.25 
B. How It Worked 
With 140 politicians involved, including heads of state and elected 
officials from more than fifty countries, 26 how did Mossack Fonseca keep 
these fraudulent activities under the radar for many years? The key was to 
create a complicated web of relationships among all parties involved to 
camouflage any link between the law firm and the true beneficiaries. 
Mossack Fonseca never worked directly with the true beneficial owners. 
Instead, the “actual clients” on record were these intermediaries who were 
often accountants, asset managers, bank representatives, or other lawyers.27 
They were the ones ordering the “products,” paying the bills, and 
communicating with Mossack Fonseca on behalf of the true beneficiaries.28 
It starts with an intermediary contacting Mossack Fonseca to discuss 
what the true owner was looking for, which was usually an offshore 
company.29 Then, the firm offers offshore companies from a variety of 
jurisdictions, “most frequently in the British Virgin Islands[,] Panama, . . . 
the Bahamas, Bermuda, Samoa, Uruguay, Hong Kong, the [U.S.] tax 
havens30 of Nevada, Wyoming[,] Delaware and . . . Florida and the 
                                                          
 24 Id. at 59. 
 25 Id. at 59, 315. 
 26 Panama Papers: The Power Players, THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/the-power- 
players/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). 
 27 Harding, supra note 1, at viii. 
 28 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
 29 Id. 
 30 In the United States, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) was passed to help the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) access 
bank records and facilitate investigations for money laundering. However, detecting and 
investigating money laundering activities becomes a challenge when (1) in some states, 
LLCs are not required to disclose the true beneficial owners, and (2) foreign sources of 
income are not subject to U.S. taxes. 
 
See Peter D. Hardy, Scott Michel and Fred Murray, Is the United States Still a Tax Haven? 
The Government Acts on Tax Compliance and Money Laundering Risks, J. of Tax Prac. & 
Proc. 25, 26 (June-July 2016) (“[T]he States of Nevada, Wyoming and Delaware, . . . allow 
for the quick creation of limited liability companies (LLCs) without identifying the true 
beneficial owners”). In the United States, incorporation is a state matter, not a federal issue. 
 
Furthermore, according to IRS.gov, “foreign [sources of] income received by a nonresident 
alien is not subject to U.S. taxation.” Therefore, money earned outside the United States are 
not taxed. See also, Samuel Brunson, The U.S. as Tax Haven? Aiding Developing Countries 
by Revoking the Revenue Rule, 5 COLUM. J. OF LAW 170, 178 (2016) (“For more than ninety 
years, nonresident aliens and foreign corporations have owed no U.S. tax on interest they 
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Netherlands.”31 An offshore company is then sold to the intermediary from 
nearly fifty different offices worldwide.32 As Obermayer explains it, 
A standard shell company costs the seller next to nothing and the 
formalities are quickly dispatched. The buyer has his company in a 
click of the fingers for only a few hundred [U.S.] dollars and can 
dispose of it [quickly] and easily once it has served its purpose. 
Also, no one will ever find out whom it belonged, which is ideal for 
dodgy dealings.33 
To ensure that there was a “protective screen” around the identities of 
the true beneficiaries/owners, Mossack Fonseca would hire or “nominate” 
individuals to act as “directors”34 of these new offshore companies. Their 
job was to act as the true owners and sign all the necessary legal 
documents.35 
In reality, these “Nominee Directors” were only following orders from 
Mossack Fonseca and the true owners of the company; they did not benefit 
much from their role.36 In fact, “they are the exploited underclass of the 
offshore world.”37 Many of them were working-class citizens who did not 
even understand the documents that they were signing. David Cameron’s 
late father, Ian, who had an offshore fund connected to Mossack Fonseca, 
“hired a small army of Bahamas residents to sign paperwork, including a 
part-time Bishop.”38 
Another example is a 55-year-old Filipina housekeeper, Nesita 
Manceau, who did everything required from an actual corporate director.39 
There also was Leticia Montoya Moran, a 63-year-old working-class 
Panamanian who had a monthly salary of only $900, yet had sat as a 
“corporate officer” and on boards of 10,969 companies.40 When confronted, 
                                                                                                                                      
earn on bank deposits in U.S. banks. As a result, nonresidents hold hundreds of billions of 
dollars in U.S. bank deposits. In addition, nonresident aliens and foreign corporations who 
receive U.S.-source ‘portfolio interest’ owe no taxes on that interest, even though U.S. 
persons holding the same securities would owe taxes on the interest.”). 
 31 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 14. 
 34 Also known as “Nominee Directors”. See OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 14-15. 
 35 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 14-15. 
 36 Id.; see also Tim Johnson, Did this Panama Papers Housekeeper Really Direct a 
North Korean Arms Deal?, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (May 10, 2016 at 10:18 AM), 
https://www. mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/article76635047.html. 
 37 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 324. 
 38 Harding, supra note 1, at viii; see also Juliette Garside, Fund Run by David 
Cameron’s Father Avoided Paying Tax in Britain, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 4, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/04/panama-papers-david- 
cameron-father-tax-bahamas. 
 39 Johnson, supra note 36. 
 40 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 324. 
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Montoya admits, “I have no idea what the companies are for, who they are 
sold to, or what exactly they do.”41 As Jack Blum42 puts it, “[even] if you 
waterboard [these Nominee Directors], they wouldn’t come up with the 
name of the beneficial owner because they don’t know.”43 
An example of this structure is Sergei Roldugin’s44 offshore company. 
A Rossiya Bank representative held the power of attorney to conduct 
business on Roldugin’s behalf and was the point of contact for a Zurich-
based law firm.45 This Zurich-based law firm was an intermediary that 
relayed the true owner’s (Roldugin’s) wishes to a Mossack Fonseca 
subsidiary in Geneva.46 Through this complex web of relationships, 
Mossack Fonseca therefore only needed to communicate with its Geneva 
subsidiary. This structure is similar to the telephone game47 children play 
— effectively concealing the true identity of the beneficiary and owner.48 
C. The Aftermath 
Mossack Fonseca stated, in response to the leak, that it “merely 
help[ed] incorporate companies” and that it had “conduct[ed] a thorough 
due-diligence process” of every client it agreed to work with.49 It was not 
until ten months after the leak that the Panamanian police arrested Jurgen 
Mossack and Ramon Fonseca. 50 Although both faced money laundering 
charges linked to the Petrobras bribery scandal, they both were released on 
bail only a few months after their arrest.51 In March 2018, Mossack Fonseca 
released a statement that it was to close all of its remaining offices due to 
the “reputational deterioration” and “irreparable damage” caused by the 
                                                          
 41 Id. 
 42 Jack Blum is a Washington D.C. lawyer who investigated offshore corporations and 
money laundering schemes for decades. 
 43 Johnson, supra note 36. 
 44 Sergei Roldugin is a famous cellist, a godfather to the Russian President’s eldest 
daughter, and Vladimir Putin’s best friend. He owned “a small stake” in Rossiya Bank, 
which is private bank in St. Petersburg; see OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 7-19. 
 45 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 20. 
 46 Id. 
 47 The Telephone Game is where players form a line and pass down a message from one 
end to the other by whispering the message to the player in front of them. The first player 
comes up with a message, which is then whispered to the ear of the second player, then the 
second player passes the same message to the third player, and so on—all until it reaches the 
final player. 
 48 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 20. 
 49 Richard L. Cassin, Mossack Fonseca to Close Doors at End of Month, THE FCPA 
BLOG (Mar. 16, 2018 at 8:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2018/3/16/mossack-
fonseca-to-close-doors-at-end-of-month.html; see also Due Diligence and “Know your 
Customer,” MOSSACK FONSECA, http://mossfonmedia.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 50 Fitzgibbon, supra note 15. 
 51 Id. 




After the Panama Papers were released, and all the fraudulent 
activities were disclosed around the world, the public began pressuring their 
own governments to act. Several public officials eventually stepped down. 
Several governments around the world conducted their own investigations, 
which resulted in over $700 million in back taxes and fines—bringing 
money back onshore.53 Many have also tried to strengthen their anti-money-
laundering laws. However, while these attempts may be seen as a step 
forward, some reforms proposed in response to the Panama Papers have not 
been successful or effective. 
III. GLOBAL RESPONSES TO THE PANAMA PAPERS: PROPOSED 
REFORMS & OBJECTIONS 
In response to the Panama Papers, numerous domestic and 
international jurisdictions looked to strengthening their laws to regulate the 
criminal activity of money laundering. The necessity to address this issue 
stems from the fact that offshore shell companies are not only being used 
by the super-wealthy tax evaders, but also by criminal organizations and 
terrorist groups.54 On the other hand, there are concerns that these types of 
public disclosures could not only create national security issues and cause 
political instability, but could also impact a client’s willingness to rely on 
attorney-client privilege.55 
A. The Need for Transparency 
Transparency International56 calls for public registers of all beneficial 
owners to restrict corrupt individuals from using secret trusts and 
companies to hide illicit wealth.57 As Jose Ugaz, Chair of Transparency 
International, stated, “world leaders must come together and ban the secret 
companies that fuel grand corruption and allow the corrupt to benefit from 
                                                          
 52 Id. 
 53 Cecile S. Gallego, Panama Papers Investigations Bring More Than $700 Million 
Back Onshore, THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (June 26, 
2018), https://www.icij.org/blog/2018/06/panama-papers-investigations-bring-700-million-
back-onshore/. 
 54 See also Bruce Zagaris, The Merging of The Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Money 
Laundering Regimes, 34.1 LAW AND POLICY IN INT’L BUS., 45 (2002). 
 55 See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Following the Money: Lessons from the 
Panama Papers: Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 807 (2017). 
 56 Transparency International is a nongovernmental organization that “is committed to 
advancing accountability, integrity and transparency”; See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 
Our Accountability, https://www.transparency.org/ (“we aim to be an example of good 
governance, ethical practice and openness to greater transparency.”) 
 57 Press Release, Transparency International Secretariat, Transparency International 
Calls for Immediate Action by World Leaders to Stop Secret Companies, TRANSPARENCY 
INT’L (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/transparency_ 
international_calls_for_immediate_action_by_world_leaders_to_s 
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ill-gotten wealth.”58 The G20 promised to act59 and has supported measures 
to increase the transparency of beneficial ownerships.60 However, not much 
has been done to implement such reforms. 
In 2014, the G20 countries adopted the “G20 High-Level Principles on 
Beneficial Ownership Transparency.”61 Even before the Panama Papers, the 
G20 “encourage[d] all countries to tackle the risks raised by the opacity of 
legal persons and legal arrangements. . . . Improving the transparency of 
legal persons and arrangements is important to protect the integrity and 
transparency of the global financial system.”62 Since 2014, the G20 
countries have not done much to improve their legal frameworks to 
implement a system of transparency. 
In particular, ten G20 countries and two G20 guest countries have 
‘very weak’ legal frameworks when it comes to providing law 
enforcement, tax authorities and financial intelligent units with 
access to any beneficial ownership information. The UK is the only 
G20 country to have established a central register of beneficial 
ownership information that is publicly available. . . . Argentina, 
India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey have not 
significantly improved their framework since 2015.63 
Nevertheless, there has been a trend towards “entity transparency,” 
which aims to target money laundering, consumer fraud, tax fraud, and 
other criminal activities.64 
1. Panama 
On April 29, 2016, soon after the release of the Panama Papers, 
Panamanian President Juan Carols Varela Rodriguez, through an Executive 
Decree, established the Committee of Independent Experts—an 
independent committee that was mandated to formulate recommendations 
“to achieve transparency objectives required by the international 
community.”65 According to the Ambassador of the Republic of Panama to 
                                                          
 58 Id. 
 59 OBERMAYER, supra note 1, at 20. 
 60 Transparency International Secretariat, supra note 57. 
 61 See G20 High-Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership Transparency, G20 
Australia (2014), https://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/AntiCorruption/ Documents/ 
G20High-LevelPrinciplesOnBeneficialOwnershipTransparency.pdf. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Press Release, Transparency International Secretariat, G20 Countries Moving Too 
Slowly to Combat Financial Crime, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www. 
transparency.org/news/pressrelease/g20_countries_moving_too_slowly_to_combat_financia
l_crime. 
 64 See generally Jenik Radon & Mahima Achuthan, Beneficial Ownership Disclosure: 
The Cure for the Panama Papers Ills. 70.2 J. OF INT’L AFFAIRS, 85 (2017). 
 65 Committee of Independent Experts, Final Report (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www. 
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Washington, D.C., Emanuel Gonzalez-Revilla, the committee is expected to 
“deliver nothing less than an honest, accurate, and independent assessment 
of Panama’s system and how it can better promote transparency.”66 The 
Committee eventually released a report, recommending that: 
Panama achieve a high standard in transparency and effective 
control of illicit flows, while retaining its competitiveness as a 
financial, service and domiciliary center of international 
organizations and remain off any discriminatory list or qualification 
of opacity or lack of transparency. Achieving these goals will require 
investment, legislation and a high degree of commitment by the 
authorities and regulatory bodies of Panama, and require the 
strengthening of the control and reporting systems for the different 
productive sectors of the country and all organizations that are 
domiciled in Panama.67 
The Committee also recommended the Financial Intelligence Unit and 
the Panamanian judicial system to be completely independent and free from 
the influence of other powers of the State.68 The report further attempted to 
balance the need to implement stronger international transparency standards 
with the maintenance of Panama’s competitive international financial 
services.69 
Since the release of the Panama Papers, Panamanian authorities closed 
down more than 275,000 offshore companies and have “sanctioned 
delinquent offshore companies with financial penalties.”70 As part of the 
effort, budgets for financial regulatory agencies have also been raised.71 
Furthermore, the government also implemented “Operation Patria” to 
reduce organized crime and illicit cash flows.72 In the following statement, 
President Varela reaffirmed his commitment to transparency: 
                                                                                                                                      
presidencia.gob.pa/tmp/file/1503/INDEPENDENT%20EXPERT%20COMMITTEE.pdf. 
 66 Emanuel Gonzalez-Revilla, Panama Ambassador to U.S.: Our Transparency 
Commitment Remains Strong, TIME (Aug. 14, 2016), http://time.com/4450180/panamas-
transparency-commitment/. 
 67 Bruce Zagaris, Panama Committee of Independent Experts Issues Report On 
Improving Transparency, 32 NO. 12 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 471 (2016). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Will Fitzgibbon, The Biggest Change After the Panama Papers? The One Inside 
People’s Heads, THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 
2018), https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/biggest-change-panama- 
papers-one-inside-peoples-heads/. 
 71 Hugh Bronstein, Panama Needs New Anti-Corruption Laws to Combat Tax Dodgers: 
Panel, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-tax/panama-
needs-new-anti-corruption-laws-to-combat-tax-dodgers-panel-idUSKBN13H08H. 
 72 Press Release, Government implements “Operation Patria” to reduce organized 
crime and traffic of illicit substances, THE MINISTRY OF THE PRESIDENCY (Oct. 20, 2015), 
https://www.presidencia.gob.pa/en/News/Government-implements-Operation-Patria-to-
reduce-organized-crime-and-traffic-of-illicit-substances-. 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 40:87 (2019) 
98 
In the 21 months of my administration, we had already improved our 
international reporting standards and introduced ‘know your client’ 
regulations for law firms that register corporations. . . . Panama is 
fully committed to bilateral automatic information exchange as part 
of our efforts to promote greater financial and legal transparency.73 
While Panama has shown its commitment, there is still much to be 
done. 
2. The United States 
On May 6, 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama74 announced that the 
United States intended on passing initiatives on tax and entity transparency. 
He called for a “Reciprocal Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act” 
(Reciprocal FATCA) which aims to strengthen the ability of the United 
States government to work with other countries to fight tax evasion through 
full reciprocity.75 Since 2010, FATCA required foreign banks to tell the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) about American-held accounts.76 A 
“Reciprocal” FATCA would encourage transnational cooperation by 
requiring the United States to engage in the automatic information 
exchange. 
On November 13, 2018, Singapore signed a Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement (TIEA) and a Reciprocal FATCA Model 1 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) with the United States.77 The purpose 
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was to “improve international tax compliance through mutual assistance in 
tax matters based on an effective infrastructure for the automatic exchange 
of information.”78 The Agreement states: 
The Government of the United States acknowledges the need to 
achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information 
exchange with Singapore . . . . [T]he United States is committed to 
further improve transparency and enhance the exchange relationship 
with Singapore by pursuing the adoption of regulations and 
advocating and supporting relevant legislation to achieve such 
equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information exchange.79 
Although the agreement was recently signed, it has not yet been 
ratified, and therefore, it currently does not have the force of law.80 
Nevertheless, it is a step towards cross-border collaboration. 
Furthermore, on May 6, 2016, President Obama also called on 
Congress to step up; there had been eight tax treaties that the Senate had not 
passed for years, which could give the government stronger tools to 
investigate American offshore accounts.81 On February 6, 2018, the Senate 
held a Judicial Committee hearing on “Beneficial Ownership: Fighting 
Illicit International Financial Networks Through Transparency.”82 There 
was a proposal to create a registry of beneficial owners, which may be a 
“pragmatic and necessary step to combat money laundering.”83 This bill, 
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known as the True Incorporation for Transparency for Law Enforcement 
Act (TITLE Act), allows for both civil and criminal penalties, such as a 
fine, a prison term for up to three years, or both, when an individual has 
provided false or fraudulent beneficial ownership information, or has 
willfully failed to provide complete or updated beneficial ownership 
information.84 However, there were many concerns raised during the 
judicial hearing about these proposed bills on transparency.85 On one hand, 
there was Senator Mike Lee, who had concerns about the impact on free 
speech.86 Along his side was Brian O’Shea,87 who raised concerns about the 
failure of the TITLE Act to adequately protect privacy rights and prevent 
the misuse of information that would be available to several people.88 On 
the opposite end was Senator Sheldon Whitehouse who argued that U.S. 
secrecy only weakens U.S. national security overall.89 
The American Bar Association (ABA) also opposes the proposed 
Beneficial Ownership Transparency Reform.90 One of the major objections 
of the ABA is the impingement on lawyer-client confidentiality and the 
undermining of attorney-client privilege.91 While the ABA “supports 
reasonable and necessary domestic and international measures to fight these 
illicit activities,” the TITLE Act would reclassify lawyers as “formation 
agents” under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)—thereby subjecting them to the 
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BSA’s suspicious activity reporting (SAR) requirements. 92 In other words, 
the TITLE Act “would compel lawyers to report certain privileged or 
confidential client information to government authorities . . . under penalty 
of harsh civil and criminal sanctions.”93 Another reason for the opposition 
is the cost of compliance; “it would impose burdensome, costly, and 
unworkable new regulatory burdens on small business.”94 
The ABA further argues that the TITLE Act seems duplicative and 
unnecessary because the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
already issued a new Customer Due Diligence Rule (in effect in May 
2018).95 This rule requires financial institutions “to collect certain specific 
beneficial ownership information regarding entities that establish new bank 
accounts” and provide access to federal law enforcement.96 FinCEN’s 
Customer Due Diligence Rule has four core elements: 
(1) customer identification and verification, (2) beneficial ownership 
identification and verification, (3) understanding the nature and 
purpose of customer relationships to develop a customer risk profile, 
and (4) ongoing monitoring for reporting suspicious transactions and 
maintaining and updating customer information.97 
Although it looks like a good start, it is not enough. Former Michigan 
Senator Carl Levin explains that this FinCEN Rule was a “significant step 
backward from current practice” because it was still quite limited and did 
not go far enough to prevent “terrorists, money launderers, tax evaders and 
other wrongdoers” from anonymously misusing financial institutions.98 
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Janis Meyer, a professional liability partner at Hinshaw & Culbertson, 
further explains that “[w]hile large firms typically do have systems in place 
to alert them if a potential client has been flagged by a law enforcement 
agency, every jurisdiction has its own rules regarding what kind of due 
diligence is mandatory.”99 
While there has been disagreement as to how to reform the laws to 
address the problem of tax evasion and money laundering, the United States 
investigation of the Panama Papers, at the very least, seems to be moving 
forward. On December 4, 2018, four men were criminally charged in the 
United States for their involvement with the Panama Papers and Mossack 
Fonseca.100 Each of these four men were “charged with wire fraud, tax 
fraud, money laundering, and other crimes.”101 “Wire fraud can carry a jail 
term of 20 years.”102 
Among these four men were Ramses Owens, a Panamanian attorney 
who worked for Mossack Fonseca, and Dirk Brauer, who was a German 
investment manager for Mossfon Asset Management, a Mossack Fonseca 
affiliate.103 Investigators discovered that both Owens and Brauer had 
established and managed “sham foundations, opaque offshore trusts and 
undeclared bank accounts” to assist Mossack Fonseca’s American clients in 
concealing their income from United States tax authorities.104 American 
clients were advised how to illegally bring money into the United States 
from their offshore accounts through “specially created debit cards and [by] 
falsely claiming [that] the money had come from the sale of companies.”105 
In addition to these two were Richard Gaffey, an American 
accountant, and Harald Joachim von der Goltz, a former Mossack Fonseca 
client and former United States resident.106 Von der Goltz falsely claimed 
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that his Guatemalan mother was the actual owner of his offshore 
holdings.107 In connection with these four men, German authorities had 
deployed about “170 police officers, prosecutors, and tax inspectors” to 
investigate “six Deutsche Bank offices around Frankfurt,” specifically two 
bank employees who allegedly assisted in the establishment of these 
offshore shell companies and helped clients launder money.108 This comes 
to show that a transnational collaborative effort is imperative in the 
investigation of the Panama Papers, as well as in tackling the global 
problem of money laundering, tax evasion, and other related fraudulent 
activities. 
This is the first criminal prosecution that has developed from the 
Panama Papers in the United States. As Brian Benczkowski, an assistant 
attorney general, stated, “[t]he charges announced today demonstrate our 
commitment to prosecute professionals who facilitate financial crime across 
international borders and the tax cheats who utilize their services.”109 While 
the proposed legislative and administrative reforms have not been so 
successful, the prosecution of these four men at least demonstrates to the 
public and to the international community that the United States is still 
dedicated to deterring money laundering and tax evasion schemes. 
3. The European Union 
The European Union (E.U.) sought to amend its Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive (AMLD) to address the illegal and fraudulent use of 
offshore shell companies. It required the E.U. Member States to strengthen 
their laws regarding the disclosure of beneficial owners, create a shared 
registry of beneficial owners, and implement penalties for 
noncompliance.110 It was a push towards a more multilateral framework to 
better fight the global problem of corruption. 
Because each E.U. Member State had different policies, definitions, 
and sanctions regarding money laundering violations, it was harder to hold 
criminals accountable. Therefore, to effect cross-border cooperation, both 
judicially and through law enforcement, it was important to create a 
multilateral agreement among the Member States. The amended AMLD not 
only allowed for the exchange and sharing of information among Member 
States, but it also created more uniform rules, especially because “[t]hese 
differences in legal frameworks can also be exploited by criminals and 
terrorists who could carry out financial transactions where they perceive 
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anti-money laundering measures to be weakest.”111 
For example, Article 18 of the fourth amended AML Directive 
(4AMLD) requires the application of “enhanced customer due diligence 
(ECDD) measures when dealing with natural or legal entities established in 
high risk third countries.”112 Article 12 of the 4AMLD also addressed the 
use of online prepaid cards by lowering the thresholds (from 250 to 150 
EUR) to which ECDD measures would apply.113 “Limiting the anonymity 
of prepaid instruments will incentivize using such instruments for 
legitimate purposes only, and will decrease their attractiveness for terrorist 
and criminal purposes.”114 Also, Article 30 and 31 of the 4AMLD included 
rules regarding the collection, storing, and access to information on the 
ultimate beneficiaries/owners of companies.115 
Furthermore, on June 8, 2016, the European Parliament decided to set 
up an inquiry committee, known as the PANA Committee,116 to investigate 
and “acquire more detailed information on offshore companies and their 
ultimate beneficiaries.”117 The European Union was the “first regional 
organization to adopt a comprehensive [Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF)] regulatory framework.”118 
However, while these efforts have been strong, there are still 
implementation issues and problematic inconsistencies. The definition of 
money laundering under E.U. law has expanded through several 
amendments, but much more needs to be done in the synchronization of 
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On April 11, 2016, several days after the Panama Papers were 
disclosed globally, Germany’s Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, 
published an “Action Plan against Tax Fraud, Tax Avoidance Schemes and 
Money Laundering – 10 Next Steps for a Fair International Tax System and 
a More Effective Combat Against Money Laundering.”120 In addition to 
urging countries to work together by closely coordinating with the E.U. and 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
goal was to also convert some of the key points from this Action Plan into 
legislative proposals to the German Parliament. 121 
First, Germany urged Panama to cooperate by providing an “automatic 
exchange of information” and requiring “full transparency,” such that 
“[s]hareholders or managers must be obliged to provide proof on a regular 
basis of the economic activities that their company performs.”122 Second, to 
implement a more global and collaborative solution, the OECD would need 
to create uniform criteria to harmonize national and international 
blacklists.123 Germany suggested that the Europeans will be taking the lead 
in creating such joint list.124 
Third, “the new standard for the automatic exchange of information on 
tax matters” should not only involve 100 countries, but instead, there must 
be a collective effort to “increase the pressure” on other countries in order 
“to make sure that offering a haven for illicit earnings is no longer worth 
it.”125 Schäuble recognized the global impact of money laundering, and the 
necessity of establishing a global collaborative effort to curtail fraudulent 
and tax-evasion schemes. 
Fourth, there is a need for a mechanism to monitor the automatic 
exchange of information among countries.126 Although establishing a 
system to monitor the transnational exchange of information may be 
expensive, collaboration could expedite investigations and create greater 
obstacles for those seeking to engage in money laundering. Fifth, global 
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registers of beneficial owners are needed to effect more transparency on a 
global scale, which has already been agreed within the E.U. Member States 
through the AMLD.127 Sixth, a systematic link among national registers 
should be established to perform data comparisons and create a stronger 
global effort in tracking down corrupt and fraudulent financial activities.128 
Seventh, while banks are already subject to criminal sanctions if they 
support the tax evasion schemes of their clients, firms that offer tax-saving 
models should also be subjected to disclosure obligations.129 Eighth, 
companies can and should be held responsible to a greater degree even if 
the criminal activity was done independently by an employee working as an 
agent of the institution.130 This would incentivize institutions to take a more 
supervisory role of their employees, and to require employees to conduct 
more thorough investigative due diligence of potential clients. 
Ninth, tax evaders should not be able to avoid punishment and escape 
sanctions through “limitation periods” (i.e., statute of limitations), but 
instead, “limitation periods” should only start to run once the tax evader has 
“fulfilled the (existing and new) reporting obligations for foreign 
relations.”131 Finally, Germany will be establishing strict AML measures 
and “require a legal initiative to enhance the skimming-off of profits from 
illegal transactions as well as introducing tougher sanctions and making it 
easier to freeze assets.”132 
In addition to the Action Plan, the German Federal Criminal Police 
Office (also known as “BKA” or Bundeskriminalamt in German) has been 
persistent in tracking down German-based criminals and fraudsters linked 
to the Panama Papers; the BKA wanted access to the complete database of 
leaked documents that only a selected number of journalists have access 
to.133 However, to protect its anonymous source, Süddeutsche Zeitung had 
refused to hand over a copy of the Panama Papers to German officials. 
Nonetheless, the German Federal Criminal Police Office was able to 
purchase a copy of the 11.5 million leaked documents for 5 million EUR 
from an anonymous source.134 While payment for the leaked documents in 
this instance did not go directly to the whistleblower, there seems to be 
greater ethical implications if whistleblowers are monetarily incentivized. 
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IV. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WHISTLEBLOWING 
Many offshore tax havens, several of which were former British 
colonies, have been practicing the British common laws’ “banking secrecy 
rules” where a banker owed its client an implied contractual duty of 
confidentiality, and thereby, maintaining assets in strict secrecy.135 While 
most countries do offer a similar kind of duty to their clients, the main 
distinction is that these offshore havens “will not breach their wall of 
secrecy even when a major violation of another nation’s laws may be 
involved”; they assert that their municipal law prohibits the breach of 
confidentiality.136 
In response to the Panama Papers leak, the Panama National Bar 
Association (PNBA) issued a communiqué.137 It deemed the disclosures as 
“unlawful, both the theft of correspondence as well as the non-authorized 
disclosure of attorney-client communications.”138 The PNBA also called for 
increased prison sentences to those who violate the infringement of 
privacy.139 
A. Incentivizing Whistleblowers 
While most offshore havens strongly disincentivize whistleblowing, 
there are other countries that have laid out incentives and protections for 
whistleblowers. In the United States, a whistleblower who voluntarily 
provides information to the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
which successfully leads to SEC enforcement or “administrative action in 
which the SEC obtains monetary sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000 
may receive an award equal to between 10% and 30% of the monetary 
sanctions collected by the SEC.”140 On May 24, 2016, the SEC announced 
that it “will jointly award more than $450,000 to two individuals for a tip 
that led the agency to open a corporate accounting investigation and for 
their assistance once the investigation was underway.”141 As Edward 
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Snowden puts it, unveiling corruption “doesn’t happen by itself.”142 Still, 
while whistleblowing helps reveal corruption, there are ethical implications 
of monetarily incentivizing whistleblowers. 
A lot is at stake when someone “blows the whistle.” Yet, the 
anonymous source behind the Panama Papers, as well as Edward Snowden, 
did not seek monetary compensation.143 Without a personally-driven 
incentive, it is easier to understand the motives of a whistleblower. The 
individual behind the Panama Papers, John Doe, was more motivated by 
“the scale of injustice that the documents would reveal.”144 
‘I do not work for any government or intelligence agency, directly or 
as a contractor, and I never have,’ [John Doe] wrote in his manifesto 
. . . . ‘My viewpoint is entirely my own, as was my decision to share 
the documents with Süddeutsche Zeitung and the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists, not for any specific political 
purpose, but simply because I understood enough about their 
contents to [realize] the scale of the injustices they described.’145
  
Furthermore, journalists from Süddeutsche Zeitung, including 
Obermayer and Obermaier, “never [pay] for information, not only because 
[they] don’t have the money, but primarily on principle. This also reduces 
people’s temptation to fob [them] off with fake documents.”146 It is already 
challenging to ascertain the true motives of a whistleblower, but it is even 
more complicated when money is involved. On one hand, potential 
whistleblowers fear for their safety and job security, which is likely why 
money could be an incentive. However, monetary incentives could also 
influence individuals with bad motives. 
It seems like the real incentive should be a form of actual protection. 
“Whistle-Blowers aren’t particularly well protected, even in Germany, and 
each person who knows an informant’s identity is a potential risk—even, or 
perhaps especially, if that person is a journalist.”147 Furthermore, job 
security and reputations are at stake, because no company would want to 
hire an employee who is known to whistle-blow.148 Reputations are at stake 
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because if you attach your name to the whistleblowing, everyone will 
know, including your current and future clients and colleagues. In addition 
to professional insecurity, one’s life could also be in danger. As such, it is 
quite unenticing for people to come forward, even if money is involved. 
B. Ethical Duties of Lawyers 
The purpose of securities laws like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA)149 is to “substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the 
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus . . . achieve a high standard of 
business ethics in the securities industry.”150 Congress designed the FCPA 
as a “strong anti-bribery law . . . urgently needed to bring these corrupt 
practices to a halt and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the 
American business system.”151 In the United States, attorneys use the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct as 
a guide. While the Model Rules are not “law” per se, many states have 
adopted these rules along with their own statues on legal ethics. 
There are times when the ABA Model Rules conflict with the FCPA 
or other securities regulations. Conflict between these rules may arise when 
an attorney must make disclosures to the Department of Justice or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) about a client, but such 
information is usually protected by attorney-client privilege. An example is 
the FCPA requirement for lawyers to make certain financial disclosures to 
the SEC.152 
Under ABA Model Rule 1.8., “a lawyer shall not use information 
relating to the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client 
unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by 
these rules.”153 Monetarily incentivizing whistleblowers lawyers is a 
violation of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to its client, per Rule 1.8. Not only 
is the whistleblower lawyer using information to the disadvantage of its 
client, but it is also used against the client for the whistleblower’s own 
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advantage (monetary compensation for whistleblowing). However, it all 
goes back to the “crime and fraud” exception of 1.6: 
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . (2) 
to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial 
interest or property of another . . . 154 
Even though there is a definite conflict of interest here, disclosing 
under these exceptions could make the lawyer immune to a Rule 1.8 
violation. However, that immunity might not stand if the primary 
motivation for establishing an attorney-client relationship and disclosing 
confidential and/or privileged information is to acquire a monetary reward 
for whistleblowing. Furthermore, although Rule 1.6(b)(2) does not 
automatically “require” the lawyer to reveal the client’s misconduct,155 the 
lawyer may not counsel or assist a client in furtherance of criminal or 
fraudulent activities—which is different from what Mossack Fonseca did.156 
Under Rule 1.16, “a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where 
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a 
client if . . . the representation will result in violation of the rules of 
professional conduct or other law.”157 
If there are laws that supersede the ABA Model Rules that require 
disclosure (e.g., SEC, FCPA, or other federal law), then the lawyer must 
comply with the law and disclose.158 Furthermore, Mossack Fonseca 
attorneys, if licensed to conduct legal services in the United States, would 
have also violated Rule 1.4(a)(5), where a lawyer shall “consult with the 
client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct” when it is 
clear that the client “expects assistance not permitted by the Rules . . . or 
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other law.”159 In this instance, Rule 1.4(a)(5) requires the lawyer to explain 
to its client its inability to assist.160 Instead of detailing their inability to 
serve clients who intended to commit fraud and corruption, Mossack 
Fonseca continued to assist in its full capacity. According to Rule 8.4(c), 
“[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”161 
Moreover, if John Doe, the whistleblower, was a lawyer working 
within Mossack Fonseca and was aware “that another lawyer has 
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a 
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as 
a lawyer,”162 and if he had a license to practice in the United States, then 
John Doe would have had a duty to disclose—which he had fulfilled 
anonymously. 
On the other hand, lawyers employed by organizations, such as in-
house counsels to corporations, have duties that slightly differ from a law 
firm lawyer. According to the SEC,—which had adopted a final rule 
establishing standards of professional conduct “for attorneys who appear 
and practice before the commission on behalf of issuers”—to deter 
corporate misconduct and fraud, 
Corporate wrongdoers at the lower or middle levels of the corporate 
hierarchy will be aware that an attorney who becomes aware of their 
misconduct is obligated under the rule to report it up-the-ladder to 
the highest levels of the corporation. In the event that wrongdoing or 
fraud exists at the highest levels of a corporation, those committing 
the misconduct will similarly know that the corporation’s attorneys 
are obligated to report any misconduct of which they become aware 
up-the-ladder to the corporation’s board and its independent 
directors.163 
However, it is stipulated in the Model Rules that a lawyer “shall 
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the 
organization.”164 This objective standard and room for discretion might be a 
way for a lawyer to flee from responsibility. For example, “[i]f the 
circumstances involve a constituent’s innocent misunderstanding of law and 
subsequent acceptance of the lawyer’s advice, the lawyer may reasonably 
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conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the 
matter be referred to higher authority.”165 On the other hand, “[i]f the matter 
is of sufficient seriousness, . . . referral to higher authority in the 
organization may be necessary . . . . [But] [a]ny measures taken should, to 
the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to 
the representation to persons outside the organization.”166 Although the in-
house lawyer does not have an affirmative duty to report out of the 
organization—unless stipulated by laws that supersede the ABA Model 
Rules (e.g., SEC, FCPA or other federal laws)—the lawyer may proceed as 
reasonably necessary to prevent injury to the organization. This may 
involve having to report out of the organization if the lawyer’s efforts to 
address the issue with the highest authority who can act on behalf of the 
organization fails (e.g., if such authority refuses to act or insists upon a 
clear violation of law), and if the harm “might be imputed to the 
organization” and would likely “result in substantial injury to the 
organization.”167 
V. WHO PAYS THE PRICE? 
While the super-rich have benefitted from offshore tax havens and 
money laundering schemes, people with low socio-economic backgrounds 
are really the ones who have paid the price. Luke Harding, a British 
journalist and foreign correspondent for The Guardian, emphasized that 
“[t]hose who dutifully paid their taxes, were, in fact, dupes.”168 The citizens 
of these countries whose tax receipts have been reduced due to tax 
avoidance by the wealthy have caused public funds to also be funneled 
out.169 Snowden explains that “[the] trove of leaked data about offshore tax 
havens in Panama highlights more than ever the vital role of the 
whistleblower in a free society.”170 
Obermayer further clarifies, “Africa loses out on twice as much money 
through tax evasion as it receives in development aid.”171 Because African-
based tax evaders have paid very little taxes in their countries, governments 
continue to lack money for public programs and are unable to provide 
affordable food and clothing.172 The concealment tactics of the offshore 
industry have promoted illegal arms trading, drug smuggling, and terrorist 
activities.173 “It has [also] led to water scarcity in Spain, child labor in 
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China, illegal logging in Indonesia, unsafe medicine in Nigeria, and poorly 
constructed buildings in Turkey, where collapses have killed people.”174 As 
Snowden puts it, “it happens without our knowledge, without our 
awareness, without our consent.”175 
VI. CHALLENGES TO MOVING FORWARD 
Money laundering is a globalized industry. As money laundering and 
tax evasion schemes are becoming more and more sophisticated through the 
evolution of technology, there also has been quite an evolution in the global 
and domestic AML/CTF efforts to curtail financial fraud. We see this in 
how various governments and international agencies have responded to the 
Panama Papers. However, some of the proposed solutions require 
tremendous regulatory costs, which could be a hindrance in countries that 
cannot afford it. This includes developing countries where money 
laundering is prevalent, yet regulatory resources are in a deficit because 
monetary resources are being displaced out of the country as a result of 
illegal tax evasion practices by the super-wealthy. Furthermore, most, if not 
all, banks “have [AML] systems in place, yet global money laundering 
transactions are still estimated at 2 to 5 percent of global GDP.”176 The 
bottom line is that money laundering continues to be a complicated issue 
for governments and financial institutions to tackle. 
 
A. The False Positives 
There are several challenges to the implementation of AML strategies. 
In addition to compliance costs, an important challenge is assessing the 
efficiency and success of newly implemented AML initiatives. Not only is 
money laundering already hard to detect without the help of 
whistleblowers, but it is also difficult to evaluate whether these AML 
initiatives are, in fact, preventing and catching money laundering schemes. 
Larger financial and corporate institutions continuously face the 
challenge of keeping up with the evolution of technology. As such, 
criminals who are adamant to launder money could find loopholes much 
faster than it is for firms and financial institutions to update their outdated 
systems. Current AML systems also tend to flag a large number of false 
positives, which seems counterproductive and inefficient.177 As Imam 
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Hoque178 explains: 
Today, 90 to 95 percent of alerts are false positives, yet analysts are 
legally obliged to investigate, regardless of legitimacy, due to the 
fear of enormous fines and the fact that there is now an increased 
drive to hold compliance officers, senior executives and board 
members personally liable for failing to have . . . adequate AML 
programs in place.179 
In an effort to detect illegal activity, financial institutions have 
implemented transaction monitoring systems (TMS) to flag suspicious 
activities.180 However, “[i]n an attempt to avoid missing any potential 
criminal activity, current TMS flag tenuous links,” which ultimately result 
in numerous false positives.181 
Money laundering analysts become “demotivated and demoralized 
from having to check very large numbers of false positives.”182 Focusing 
solely on tenuous transactions is also not enough because money laundering 
is not about a single transaction, but rather, it involves a sophisticated 
network of entities working in concert. “On top of that, these investigations 
are labor- and cost-intensive, keeping banks in a vulnerable position as they 
continue to waste time investigating false positives and making it more 
difficult to spot cases of true illegal activity.”183 
B. “Know Your Customer” & Know Your Employees 
Money laundering involves a complex web of entities—from 
inconspicuous individuals to shell companies. In addition to tracking 
financial transactions, there also has been a focus on detecting entities that 
might be linked to money laundering schemes or criminal networks. 
Improving due diligence procedures and implementing “Know Your 
Customer” (KYC) initiatives are some of the most important types of 
internal reform. Since 1998, “[t]he Americans had systematically fought 
against adopting the KYC principles because it was widely believed that 
they represented too great a degree of invasion of the principles of personal 
privacy.”184 Although most firms in the United States now conduct some 
form of due diligence about their current and potential clients, it has not 
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always been effective. 
Improving due diligence efforts becomes a challenge when it could 
come at the expense of losing a potential client, especially when demanding 
information that they do not want to share. As Megan M. Brooks, a 
financial risk manager for Capstone Associated Services, Ltd., had put it, 
“[d]e-risking has led some institutions to opt-out of long-term relationships 
with clients deemed ‘high-risk’.”185 Because banks have to conduct more 
intensive due diligence of potential clients, “[q]uestions have become more 
intrusive, even to go as far in some cases to research bills of lading to 
ensure the source of funds. Banks are now following the ‘Know Your 
Customer’s Customer’ mantra, due to increased regulation.”186 A procedure 
of this kind might be more exhaustive, but it could also be a detriment to 
the business as a whole, especially if it deters clients from working with 
you. 
Furthermore, gathering information about a client is not the only 
priority; due diligence on employees should also be improved. While it is 
typical to do a standard background check on employees and performance 
reviews, perhaps having annual diligence reports may help deter 
malpractice. These reports would not just be about the quality of their work, 
but also about the types of work being done using company assets. This 
could include information and work conducted on a company’s laptop, or 
purchases made using company’s assets, such as travel reimburses or taking 
clients out for dinner. While the awareness of being supervised could 
discourage illegal behavior and malpractice, it might also negatively affect 
an employee’s confidence and relationship with the company. This also 
could be a violation of privacy or labor law even if it is fairly or equally 
enforced to every employee in the firm. 
C. Formation of Shell Companies 
In addition to firms’ internal due diligence efforts, the government 
should also improve efforts in identifying criminal or shell entities. In the 
United States, individual states govern the formation of companies. A 
corporation is formed by filing the Articles of Incorporation (AOI), also 
known as a Charter, with the Secretary of State. Each state has minimum 
filing requirements, but, generally, state corporate law has become less 
restrictive over time. In most states, corporations are now permitted to 
incorporate for any purpose. In addition, the powers of corporate board of 
directors and officers have been enhanced, especially when the court gives 
deference to the business judgment rule. 
The same leeway is given in the formation of Limited Liability 
                                                          
 185 Megan M. Brooks, Overcoming Bank Over-Regulation Hassles, CAPSTONE 
ASSOCIATED SERVICES (Dec. 2015), https://www.capstoneassociated.com/pdfs/bank-over 
regulation-captives.pdf. 
 186 Id. 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 40:87 (2019) 
116 
Companies (LLCs). To form an LLC, Articles of Organization also need to 
be filed with the secretary of state. Because each state has its own 
requirements, tax-evaders and money launderers choose to create their shell 
companies in states that are not so strict. The “[s]tates of Nevada, Wyoming 
and Delaware, . . . allow for the quick creation of [LLCs] without 
identifying the true beneficial owners.”187 
Perhaps the office of the Secretary of State could start conducting due 
diligence work on the directors and officers listed in newly filed AOIs. 
Having a due diligence process could help restrict the formation of shell 
companies in tax-haven states like Nevada and Florida. However, aside 
from regulatory and enforcement costs, adding extra layers to the process 
(e.g., a screening process) can have real economic implications; 
complicating the process can easily disincentivize the formation of new 
businesses. 
D. Transnational Cooperation & Information Sharing 
Money laundering does not only thrive on transactional opacity, but 
also through anonymity—hiding the identities of all parties involved by 
using a complex web of entities that are usually based in different countries. 
Transnational cooperation, similar to what the European Union has 
established in response to the Panama Papers, could be an effective way to 
hone in on tax-evaders. 
Through cross-border cooperation and the sharing of information, 
participating countries could better track the outward flow of capital. While 
it has not yet been adequately tested, the motive for having a mode for 
transnational information sharing is to create a more efficient and 
streamlined process in the investigation of potential fraudsters and 
malpractice. “According to the OECD, for example, automatic exchanges 
of bulk taxpayer information are the most effective way to help assist tax 
authorities with enforcing their cross-border tax laws.”188 “Third party 
reporting and tax-withholding disclosures can provide information to tax 
authorities to allow them to better gauge risks of offshore tax evasion and 
aggressive international tax planning.”189 However, while some countries 
grant their government with direct access to taxpayer information, others do 
not. 
“In countries such as the United States and Canada, privacy interests 
are additionally protected by constitutional guarantees that cannot generally 
be violated by state action (e.g., the right to be free from an improper search 
or seizure).”190 There is also a concern for data security, especially since the 
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IRS “experiences one million attempts every week to hack its information 
technology systems.”191 The misuse of information is also a valid concern. 
In addition to tax-holder information, disclosures about the beneficial 
owners of offshore assets, along with the amount and nature of offshore 
investments facilitated by offshore financial intermediaries, are also 
valuable. However, many countries are reluctant to fully participate in the 
automatic exchange of information due to concerns about privacy law and 
national security. Other countries simply cannot afford the regulatory and 
enforcement costs. 
Additional challenges include the quality and reliability of information 
shared. Several countries, especially tax havens, “simply do not track these 
tax information sources” and, therefore, “they are unable to exchange this 
information when called upon to do so.”192 As Arthur Cockfield, a professor 
at Queen’s University Faculty of Law in Canada explained: 
As revealed by an analysis of tax haven data leaks, a major 
vulnerability in these efforts is the lack of reporting by hundreds of 
offshore service providers, such as trust, finance, or other financial 
service providers based in tax havens. In many cases, these offshore 
service providers at times did not report accurate tax and financial 
information on cross-border investments as required by FATF [the 
Financial Action Task Force] recommendations. Noncompliance 
resulted from a lack of due diligence, willful neglect, and legal 
insulation through indemnification agreements between the offshore 
service provider and the nonresident investor.193 
Because information shared may not be accurate, the recipient of 
offshore data will have to cross-reference the reported inflow and outflow 
of capital with the alleged source (i.e., other financial institutions that the 
offshore service provider had allegedly engaged with). 
Tom Keatinge, a former investment banker and the director of the 
Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at the Royal United 
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Services Institute, explains that money laundering thrives as a globalized 
industry; borders are immaterial when structuring these types of tax-
evading transactions, yet “borders are not immaterial for the cops who are 
trying to chase you.”194 While the ideas of transnational cooperation and the 
sharing of information sound ideal, there are so many challenges that need 
to be resolved before implementation begins. A robust system would have 
to be in place to ensure that financial information of citizens is properly 
protected. As such, regulatory and enforcement costs would be quite high, 
especially because of the man-power required to verify whether the 
information provided by another country is accurate; there needs to be a 
way to ensure that the data has not been altered. As Keatinge expressed, 
information gathering and sharing are not enough; “[w]e know that 
supervision doesn’t get the bad guys . . . . It’s investigation that gets the bad 
guys.”195 
E. Captive Entities 
Another area that has not received much attention is captive entities. A 
“captive” is defined as “an institution intended to provide services to a 
promoter and his/her associates”; it is a subsidiary company for one parent 
company or a group of companies, and is usually located in offshore tax 
havens.196 There are different kinds of captive entities. The most common 
type is captive insurance companies. 
A captive insurance company is a wholly owned subsidiary company 
that provides risk-mitigation services for its parent company or a 
group of related companies . . . . The tax concept of a captive 
insurance company is relatively simple. The parent company pays 
insurance premiums to its captive insurance company and seeks to 
deduct these premiums in its home country, often a high-tax 
jurisdiction. A parent company will [therefore] locate the captive 
insurance company in tax havens, such as Bermuda and the Cayman 
Islands to avoid adverse tax implications. Today, several states in the 
US allow the formation of captive companies. The protection from 
tax assessment is a sought-after benefit for the parent company.197 
While legitimately formed captive entities are legal, the United States 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) “has continually listed certain small captive 
(microcaptive) insurance arrangements on its ‘Dirty Dozen’ list of tax-
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abusive transactions . . . [since] the premiums paid in captive arrangements 
are often not legitimate ordinary and necessary business expenses.”198 
Although there are hardly any reported instances of captive companies 
being used for money laundering, captives are more susceptible to the risk 
of fraudulent activities—including money laundering and terrorist 
financing. “Money laundering using reinsurance could occur either by 
establishing fictitious reinsurance companies or reinsurance intermediaries, 
fronting arrangements and captives, or by misusing the normal reinsurance 
transactions.”199 Having independent intermediaries, which captive entities 
lack, play an important role in deterring money laundering activities. 
“The Cayman Islands [mere 22 miles in length] are the second-largest 
captive insurance jurisdiction in the world.”200 As of December 31, 2018, 
the Cayman Islands had a total of 703 active captives.201 In addition, “the 
total value of premiums in Cayman’s international insurance industry was 
$15.4 billion, up from $12.4 billion in 2017, and the total assets over $68.7 
billion, up from $61 billion in 2017.”202 In general terms, the Cayman 
Islands 
offers a low-tax, regulation-light environment for financial players 
from around the world, particularly Europe and the United States. In 
terms of its ratio of GDP to foreign assets, Cayman is the most 
intensive offshore financial [center] in the world, with foreign assets 
at 1,500 times the size of the domestic economy.203 
Over the past decade, and especially after the Panama Papers, there 
has been a heightened level of AML/CTF initiatives that have impacted 
both the banking and captive industries. “For captives domiciled offshore, 
some institutions deny captive bank account applications without even 
reading through the application; namely UBS and Royal Bank of 
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Canada.”204 This obstacle stems from the increased pressure on banks to 
“Know Your Customer.” As so, financial institutions domiciled onshore are 
reluctant to take on potential offshore clients that might be “high-risk” for 
money laundering. 
On May 1, 2017, the United Kingdom (UK) had adopted “an 
amendment to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill” which 
would require the 14 British overseas territories, including the Cayman 
Islands, to introduce public registers of beneficial ownership by the end of 
year 2020.205 The Cayman Islands Ministry of Financial Services was not 
pleased with this requirement and indicated that if necessary, the 
government will challenge this requirement in the “Cayman Islands courts 
through an order in council.”206 The Ministry had stated that “a public 
register will not be introduced in the Cayman Islands until such registers are 
adopted as a global standard. [So far, only] EU countries are required to 
introduce public registers by 2020, under the [fifth amended] AMLD.”207 
Furthermore, the Cayman Islands government argued that having 
public registers of beneficial ownership conflict with the Cayman Islands 
Constitution, “which provides a positive obligation on the Government to 
protect a person’s legitimate need for privacy with regard to their financial 
affairs.”208 The Ministry of Financial Services asserts that: 
The Cayman Islands Government has long [recognized] the 
importance of maintaining beneficial ownership information, 
compiling this information on a private register with information 
only made available to law enforcement agencies upon request to 
satisfy their legitimate needs for access, such as to carry out a law 
enforcement investigation . . . . The Cayman Islands takes its place 
as a leader in global finance very seriously and [recognizes] that 
beneficial ownership information – not provided publicly, but rather 
through proper legal channels to relevant authorities – does support 
the global fight against financial crimes.209 
While the Cayman Islands government has been slowly chipping on its 
wall of secrecy to keep up with international AML pressures, it is difficult 
to ignore that the territory’s economy does rely heavily on its 
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confidentiality laws. It is one of the most popular financial centers in the 
world because it allows companies to be easily formed while providing 
both asset protection and financial privacy protection. The international 
concern here is the fact that having a wall of secrecy to protect beneficial 
ownership information attracts potential money launderers who thrive on 
anonymity and opacity. 
In addition to captive insurance companies, the Cayman Islands also 
prospers from the financial industry. With “banking assets worth US $1.026 
trillion in June 2017,” the Cayman Islands is the eighth biggest banking 
center in the world.210 Similar to captive insurance companies, there are 
also captive banks. 
Usually, a captive bank is wholly owned subsidiary of a 
multinational group of companies. The purpose of a captive bank is 
to provide banking service to the group or to the parent organization. 
A captive bank works only for the parent, its customers and 
suppliers. In order to avail low capital requirements and freedom 
from exchange control, captive banks are usually located in a tax 
haven. Services provided by a captive bank include safe keeping of 
deposits, merchant banking, financing, and other services in 
association with commercial banks.211 
Since captive entities function as subsidiaries of another, usually a 
non-bank institution, and since they often operate in tax havens like the 
Cayman Islands, their activities are not very transparent. Perhaps in the 
wake of the Panama Papers, UK officials thought that focusing on captive 
and offshore entities and forcing them to disclose beneficial ownership 
information would disincentivize money laundering that is drawn to 
anonymity. 
There has been a consistent evolution of AML initiatives to confront 
the wall of secrecy in tax havens. To tackle the issue of money laundering, 
effort and cooperation is required from all valuable players: 
intergovernmental/transnational collaborations, onshore firms conducting 
KYC due diligence work, and offshore entities disclosing beneficial 
ownership information. The parent companies that are domiciled in non-tax 
haven countries should be required to disclose information about their 
subsidiaries that are domiciled in tax-havens. Without cross-border 
collaboration and cooperation, efforts in preventing money laundering and 
tax evasion schemes that thrive from a transnational network of anonymous 
entities would almost be futile. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Journalists risked their lives to achieve transparency. Some have 
already been killed for it.212 Each of the 400+ journalists from over eighty 
countries who unveiled the truth behind the Panama Papers knew about this 
risk. They understood that by participating in the investigation, they “stood 
between rule of law and those who sought to violate it.”213 One of the 
investigative journalists of the Panama Papers was killed in Malta by a car 
bomb. Daphne Caruana Galizia was investigating several Maltese 
politicians and had discovered offshore ties to the Maltese Prime Minister 
Joseph Muscat’s inner circle.214 Daphne’s sister, Corinne Vella, explains 
that “[t]hey wanted to shut her up . . . . She obviously spoke truth to power. 
That was threatening to people in power.” 215 
The Panama Papers unveiled how the most privileged and powerful 
people in the world have been operating by a different set of rules. We need 
to develop a culture of transparency and accountability to protect our basic 
freedoms. “Developing a culture of transparency and accountability, where 
we not only know what [the] government is doing, but recognize that we 
have not just the right but the responsibility to actually act in changing the 
nature of government, . . . directly holds these individuals to account.”216 
After all, “the ones who pay the price for the tax haven model are the 
citizens of all the countries whose tax receipts are reduced due to the 
activities of shell companies, or whose public funds are funneled out of the 
country and stashed away in the Caribbean.”217 
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